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abstract: We suggest that damaging mating tactics, such as physical
aggression, the evolution of genital barbs and spines, and the transfer
of seminal toxins may serve as a general means by which males can
induce females to avoid or to delay remating. Provided that cu-
mulative damage has an accelerating impact on fitness, a female who
has already been harmed by previous partner(s) may do best to
refrain from remating to avoid suffering still further damage. Con-
sequently, a male can gain through the imposition of mating costs,
even though this may reduce female fitness because by doing so he
minimizes the chances that his mate will copulate again. We develop
a game theoretical model of this possibility, focusing on toxin transfer
as an illustrative example. We show that toxicity as a means of in-
hibiting remating is phenotypically stable over a broad range of con-
ditions (although, under some circumstances, it may be necessary
to invoke other selective pressures to account for the initial evolution
of toxicity). The model predicts that toxin transfer should be more
common (and involve greater levels of toxicity) in species with greater
last-male mating advantage; it is also most likely where the poison
inflicts strongly accelerating, dose-dependent costs on females.
Keywords: sexual conflict, mating systems, manipulation, arms race.
Females of many animal species often mate with more
than one partner. This may yield a range of possible ben-
efits, including replenishment of sperm, fertility insurance,
seminal feeding, and (more controversially) increased ge-
netic diversity of offspring (Walker 1980; Thornhill and
Alcock 1983; Ridley 1988, 1993; Madsen et al. 1992; Lewis
and Austad 1994; Keller and Reeve 1995; Yasui 1998; Jen-
nions and Petrie 2000). From the perspective of an in-
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dividual male, however, subsequent remating by a female
with whom he has copulated is almost inevitably disad-
vantageous, since it leads to sperm competition and pos-
sible loss of paternity. Consequently, there is a potential
conflict of interest between the sexes over female mating
behavior, and selection will favor males that are able to
reduce the chances of or delay subsequent copulation by
their mates (Parker 1970, 1984; Simmons and Siva-Jothy
1998).
Males can prevent females from remating by fending
off rivals (see, e.g., Birkhead 1998; Gomendio et al. 1998;
Olsson and Madsen 1998), by sealing the female repro-
ductive tract with a mating plug (see, e.g., Baur 1998;
Simmons and Siva-Jothy 1998), or by interfering with the
process of mate attraction (e.g., Happ et al. 1970). Alter-
natively (or additionally), they can manipulate female be-
havior to reduce the propensity for remating. In many
insect species, for example, males are known to transfer
within the ejaculate substances that render females sexually
unreceptive and that promote oviposition (Thornhill and
Alcock 1983; Chen 1984; Cordero 1995; Simmons and
Siva-Jothy 1998).
Here, we suggest that males may also influence female
reproductive decisions through the imposition of mating
costs. A number of studies have shown that copulation
can have damaging consequences for females. For instance,
in the fruit fly Drosophila melanogaster, male accessory
gland products transferred to females during mating are
toxic, causing females with elevated rates of mating to die
younger than controls (Fowler and Partridge 1989; Chap-
man 1992; Chapman et al. 1995; Rice 1996). Furthermore,
there is evidence suggesting similar mating costs in other
species of Diptera (Chapman et al. 1998) and in the mite
Caloglyphus berlesei (Radwan and Rysinska 1999). Physical
damage to the female reproductive tract as a result of
mating has been reported in the bushcricket Metaplastes
ornatus (von Helversen and von Helversen 1991) and in
the bruchid beetle Callosubruchus maculata (Simmons and
Siva-Jothy 1998; see also Eberhard 1985), and injury as a
result of aggressive male mating tactics is common in some
mammals and birds (Daly 1978; LeBoeuf and Mesnick
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1991a, 1991b). We propose that selection may favor males
who inflict such costs on their partners because by doing
so, they discourage remating.
Our argument can be summed up as follows, using the
transfer of seminal toxins as an illustrative example: pro-
vided that the acquisition of greater quantities of toxin
has an increasingly deleterious effect on fitness (see Chap-
man et al. 1995 for evidence of a dose-dependent effect),
a female who has received a large amount from her part-
ner(s) may do best to refrain from remating to avoid re-
ceiving still more of the harmful substance. Consequently,
an individual male can gain by transferring a large dose
of the toxin, even though this may reduce female fitness
(and possibly his own reproductive output) because, by
doing so, he inhibits remating and, thus, increases his
expected share of paternity. Other harmful mating tactics
may have an equivalent effect: if, for instance, accumulated
physical damage from mating has an accelerating impact
on fitness, an individual male can once again profit by
inflicting harm on his mate because this will reduce her
propensity for remating. Seminal toxicity, or the imposi-
tion of mating costs by any other means, may, thus, serve
to manipulate female behavior.
Below, we present a game-theoretical model that ex-
amines this possibility. We examine the stability of seminal
toxin transfer in a phenotypic, game-theoretical model and
investigate the ease with which it may become established
in a population, in relation to various parameters (the
nature of the costs imposed by the toxin, the benefits that
females stand to gain from remating, and the pattern of
sperm competition). Although we focus on toxin transfer,
we emphasize that the model is applicable to any form of
cumulative damage inflicted during mating.
The Model
For simplicity, we will assume that females may mate either
once or twice. In the absence of seminal transfer of toxins,
the latter choice typically yields a net fitness benefit, which
could reflect replenishment of sperm, fertility insurance,
seminal feeding, or any combination of these factors
(Walker 1980; Thornhill and Alcock 1983; Ridley 1988,
1993; Madsen et al. 1992; Lewis and Austad 1994; Keller
and Reeve 1995; Yasui 1998). However, the benefit to be
gained by remating varies from one female to another
because of differences in nutritional condition, quantity
of stored sperm, or ability to bear the costs of locating a
new partner (see, e.g., Gromko et al. 1984; Harshman et
al. 1988; Chapman et al. 1994 for evidence that such factors
can influence propensity to mate). The fitness benefit of
remating (relative to the mean fitness of a singly mated
individual) will be denoted f, its probability distribution
among females (which we assume to be continuously dif-
ferentiable) , and the corresponding cumulative prob-p(f )
ability distribution P( f ). (Note that, for some individuals,
f may be negative, indicating that the costs of remating
outweigh the benefits to be gained.)
Males may transfer variable quantities of toxin to their
partner(s) during mating, which reduce female reproduc-
tive success. A female who acquires a total quantity t of
toxin from her partner or partners incurs an additive fit-
ness cost (relative to the mean fitness of a singly mated
individual) of c(t). We assume that , that c(t) isc(0) p 0
twice continuously differentiable, and that c ′(t) and c ′′(t)
are both positive, that is, that the cost of the toxin increases
with the amount acquired and does so at an accelerating
rate. Accelerating costs have been recorded for a number
of toxic substances (see, e.g., Bryan and Shimkin 1943;
Murphy and Cheever 1968) and may, in some cases, reflect
the action of homeostatic mechanisms that can successfully
cope with small amounts of toxin but are overwhelmed
by larger quantities (Shuey et al. 1994; Roger and Kavlock
1996). Successive doses are assumed to increase the total
cost suffered, either through cumulative damage or be-
cause persistence of the toxin leads to a buildup in the
maximum level to which the female is exposed.
Given that increasing quantities of toxin have an ac-
celerating impact on reproductive success, a female’s de-
cision whether to remate or not should depend on the
quantity of toxin transferred by her first mate, as well as
the amount she is likely to acquire by remating. If she
receives a large quantity from her first mate, she may do
best to forgo the benefits of remating to avoid the adverse
effects of acquiring still more of the harmful substance.
(Note that the assumption of accelerating costs is essential
to this argument.)
Formally, a female who receives a quantity t of toxin
from her first mate and can expect to receive from herˆt
second should remate if, and only if,
ˆ1 1 f 2 c(t 1 t ) 1 1 2 c(t)
ˆ⇒ f 1 c(t 1 t ) 2 c(t), (1)
that is, if, and only if, the benefits she stands to gain from
remating exceed some critical threshold. Provided that
(i.e., that costs are accelerating), the greater the′′c (t) 1 0
value of t (i.e., the more toxin she acquires from her first
mate), the higher this threshold becomes (i.e., the larger
the benefit needed to make remating worthwhile).
Males may, thus, benefit by transferring large amounts
of toxin, even though this adversely affects the reproduc-
tive success of their partners because by doing so, they
can reduce the chance of a female remating and, thus,
increase their expected share of paternity (we assume that
the costs of toxin production are negligible compared to
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the reduction in female fitness; see “Discussion”). The
expected fitness of an individual mutant male who trans-
fers a quantity of toxin t to his mates, given that other
males in the population transfer a quantity (and thatˆt
females, who are assumed to be able to detect and respond
to the amount of toxin they receive from an individual
male, follow the optimal policy summarized above), will
be denoted , and is given byˆw(t, t )
ˆc(t1t)2c(t)
ˆw(t, t ) p a p(f )[1 2 c(t)]d fE{
2`
`
ˆ1 p(f )(1 2 m)[1 1 f 2 c(t 1 t )]d fE
ˆc(t1t)2c(t)
`
ˆ1 p(f )m[1 1 f 2 c(t 1 t)]d f ,E }
ˆ ˆc(2t)2c(t)
(2)
where a denotes the ratio of females to males in the pop-
ulation, and m denotes the expected share of paternity
gained by the second male to mate with a female (m 1
, thus, indicates that the last male to mate with a female0.5
has an advantage, and that the first male to matem ! 0.5
with her has an advantage). The first integral in the above
equation represents the fitness gain from mating with pre-
viously unmated females, who stand to gain too little to
go on to remate. The second integral represents the fitness
gain from mating with previously unmated females who
will go on to remate. Finally, the third integral represents
the fitness gain from mating with previously mated females
(for whom the benefits of remating were large enough to
outweigh the anticipated costs of acquiring additional
toxin).
At a phenotypically stable equilibrium, the level of toxin
transfer adopted by males, denoted , must be that which∗t
maximizes an individual male’s fitness (given that it is
adopted by all other males in the population). This re-
quirement yields the necessary (though not sufficient) con-
dition
ˆ­w(t, t ) ∗
ˆp 0 for t p t p t . (3)
­t
Differentiating (2), we obtain the following expression for
,ˆ­w(t, t )/­t
ˆ­w(t, t ) ′ ′
ˆ ˆp amp[c(t 1 t ) 2 c(t)][1 2 c(t)][c (t 1 t ) 2 c (t)]
­t
′ ′
ˆ ˆ1aP[c(t 1 t ) 2 c(t)][2c (t) 1 (1 2 m)c (t 1 t )]
′
ˆ ˆ ˆ1amP[c(2t ) 2 c(t )]c (t 1 t )
′
ˆ2ac (t 1 t ).
(4)
Substituting (4) into (3) then yields, after some rearrange-
ment, the following equilibrium condition
∗ ∗ ∗P(g(t )) 1 mp(g(t ))[1 2 c(t )]
′ ∗c (2t )
2 p 0, (5a)′ ∗ ′ ∗c (2t ) 2 c (t )
where
∗ ∗ ∗g(t ) p c(2t ) 2 c(t ). (5b)
To calculate explicit solutions to (5a) and (5b), one must
specify the distribution of remating benefit p( f ) and the
cost function c(t). Having done so, these candidate equi-
libria must be tested for several further stability properties.
First, one must demonstrate that they represent fitness
maxima with respect to t. Locally, this implies that
2
ˆ­ w(t, t ) ∗
ˆ! 0 for t p t p t . (6)
2­t
To ensure that the candidate equilibrium is not just a local
but a global fitness maximum, one must additionally dem-
onstrate that
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗w(t, t ) ! w(t , t ) for all t ( t . (7)
Candidate equilibria that satisfy (7) represent “unbeatable”
strategies since a mutant individual who transfers less or
more toxin than the equilibrium amount will suffer∗t
reduced fitness compared to other members of the pop-
ulation. Finally, one must determine whether or not these
equilibria are continuously stable (see Eshel 1983; Chris-
tiansen 1991; Motro 1994; Taylor 1996), that is, whether
selection will tend to drive population strategies in the
neighborhood of toward the equilibrium value. For sta-∗t
bility in this sense, it is sufficient that
ˆ­ ­w(t, t ) ∗
ˆF ! 0 for t p t . (8)ˆtpt[ ]ˆ­t ­t
Only unbeatable strategies that are also continuously stable
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Figure 1: Graph A shows the stable level of toxin transfer at the toxic
equilibrium (solid line) and the threshold level required to initiate a
transition toward that equilibrium (dotted line), as a function of m (the
mean benefit that females stand to gain from remating), for ,j p 0.25
, and . Graph B shows the probability of a female re-a p 3 m p 0.75
mating, at the toxic equilibrium (solid line) and at the nontoxic equilib-
rium (dotted line), over the same parameter range.
represent likely “endpoints” for the trajectory of an evolv-
ing population.
Results
As stated above, to solve equations (5a) and (5b) explicitly
for , one must specify the distribution of remating ben-∗t
efit p( f ) and the cost function c(t). Unfortunately, em-
pirical data on the cumulative impact of seminal toxins
on female fitness and on the distribution of remating ben-
efits are lacking. In this section, we therefore present results
obtained for the illustrative case in which f is normally
distributed (with mean m and standard deviation j), and
cost is a power function of the quantity of toxin transferred
(i.e., , where greater values of a imply moreac(t) p t
strongly accelerating costs). The results were calculated
numerically since these functions do not yield a simple,
analytical solution.
General Features of the Results
Over the range of parameter values considered, there never
exists more than one continuously stable equilibrium at
which (i.e., at which males transfer some toxins∗t 1 0
during mating). In other words, for each set of parameter
values, we can calculate a unique stable level of toxin trans-
fer. However, for a part of this range, there also exists a
second, continuously stable equilibrium at , at∗t p 0
which no toxins are transferred. Between these two equi-
libria, which will be referred to as “toxic” and “nontoxic,”
respectively, there is a point at which the marginal benefits
and costs of increasing toxin transfer exactly balance. This
third candidate equilibrium is not, however, continuously
stable. Rather, it represents the boundary between the ba-
sins of attraction of the toxic and nontoxic equilibria. If
the population level of toxin transfer is raised above this
threshold point, the marginal benefits to an individual of
increasing toxin transfer start to outweigh the marginal
costs, suggesting that selection will tend to drive the pop-
ulation level still higher, toward the toxic equilibrium.
Conversely, if the level of toxin transfer drops below the
threshold, the marginal costs start to outweigh the mar-
ginal benefits, suggesting that selection will tend to drive
the population level even lower, toward the nontoxic equi-
librium (note that this is only an approximate summary
of the dynamics of the system—although the marginal
benefits of increasing transfer outweigh the marginal costs
in a population just above the threshold level, a mutant
individual who transfers much less toxin may still be able
to invade).
The graphs that follow show both the level of toxin
transfer at the toxic equilibrium (as a function of various
different parameter values) and also the threshold level of
transfer. The latter indicates how readily toxicity can be-
come established in a population. A low threshold implies
that even a small deviation from the nontoxic state can
trigger a transition toward the toxic equilibrium (in the
limit, as the threshold drops to 0, the nontoxic equilibrium
ceases to be continuously stable). A high threshold, by
contrast, implies that a more substantial deviation is re-
quired and, thus, that toxin transfer is harder to establish
(see “Discussion”).
Sample Solutions
Figure 1A shows the stable (solid line) and threshold (dot-
ted line) levels of toxin transfer, as a function of m (the
mean benefit that females stand to gain from remating),
for , , and . Note that while neg-j p 0.25 a p 3 m p 0.75
ative values of m imply that the majority of females do
best to refrain from remating even in the absence of toxin
transfer, there are always some females for whom the ben-
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Figure 2: Graph A shows the stable level of toxin transfer at the toxic
equilibrium (solid line) and the threshold level required to initiate a
transition toward that equilibrium (dotted line) as a function of j (the
standard deviation in remating benefit among females), for (im-m p 0
plying that, in the absence of toxin transfer, 50% of females will remate),
, and . Graph B shows the probability of a female re-a p 3 m p 0.75
mating, at the toxic equilibrium, over the same parameter range.
efits of remating outweigh the costs (the lower the value
of m, the rarer are such individuals).
The graph reveals that the outcome of the model is
highly sensitive to the expected benefits of remating. The
greater the benefits that females stand to gain, the greater
the deterrent needed to discourage remating. This leads
to an increase in the population level of toxicity required
to trigger a transition toward the toxic equilibrium (it is
only when there is a sufficiently high population level of
toxicity that the toxin transferred by an individual male
becomes an adequate deterrent). However, it also leads to
greater quantities of toxin being transferred at the toxic
equilibrium.
Figure 1B shows the probability that a female will re-
mate, again as a function of m, for , , andj p 0.25 a p 3
, at the toxic equilibrium (solid line) and at them p 0.75
nontoxic equilibrium (dotted line). Unsurprisingly, when
no toxins are transferred, the chances of a female remating
increase with the mean benefit to be gained by doing so.
At the toxic equilibrium, by contrast, the probability of
remating remains uniformly low even for high mean ben-
efits. As m increases, the greater quantities of toxin trans-
ferred by males almost entirely counteract the greater ben-
efits that females stand to gain so that the remating
probability shows only a very slight increase.
Figure 2A shows, once again, the stable (solid line) and
threshold (dotted line) levels of toxin transfer, this time as
a function of j (the standard deviation in remating
benefit), for , , and . Over a broadm p 0 a p 3 m p 0.75
range of values, variance in mating benefit has little in-
fluence on either the stable or threshold levels of toxicity.
As j approaches 0, however, the equilibrium level of toxin
transfer also drops rapidly to 0. Equally, above a critical
value of j (of ∼0.35 in this case), the threshold level of
toxicity shows a rapid increase, until the point is reached
(at about 0.4 in this case) at which a toxic equilibrium
ceases to exist. This reflects the fact that when remating
benefit is broadly distributed (i.e., p( f ) has high variance),
a slight increase in the amount of toxin that a male trans-
fers has very little impact on the proportion of his partners
that will go on to remate. Conversely, when remating ben-
efit is tightly clustered around the mean value (i.e., p( f )
has low variance), even a small increase in toxicity can
induce a large number of females to change their behavior.
As shown in figure 2B, the probability of a female re-
mating at the toxic equilibrium increases markedly with
the variance in remating benefit. Once again, this reflects
the fact that when variance is high, a given increase in
toxicity has less influence on the proportion of females
that remate (whereas when variance is low, the transfer of
even small quantities of toxin is sufficient to render re-
mating unprofitable for the great majority of females).
Having examined the effects of p( f ), the distribution
of remating benefit among females, we now turn to the
cost function c(t). Figure 3A shows the stable (solid line)
and threshold (dotted line) levels of toxin transfer as a
function of a, for , , and (higherm p 0 j p 0.25 m p 0.75
levels of a imply that cost is a more steeply accelerating
function of the quantity of toxin acquired). The graph
reveals that a toxic equilibrium is only possible if a exceeds
a critical threshold (in this case ∼2.25). Above this point,
higher values of a lead to an increase in the quantity of
toxin transferred at the toxic equilibrium and a very rapid
drop in the threshold level required to initiate a transition
toward that equilibrium. For values of a greater than about
2.26, the threshold drops to 0, implying that the nontoxic
equilibrium has ceased to be continuously stable and that
any degree of toxicity, however slight, is sufficient to in-
itiate a transition toward the toxic equilibrium. In other
words, the more strongly accelerating the costs of the toxin,
the easier it is for toxicity to become established in a
population and (to a lesser extent) the greater the quan-
tities of toxin that males are likely to employ. As shown
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Figure 3: Graph A shows the stable level of toxin transfer at the toxic
equilibrium (solid line) and the threshold level required to initiate a
transition toward that equilibrium (dotted line), as a function of a (higher
values of which imply that cost is a more steeply accelerating function
of the quantity of toxin acquired), for (implying that, in them p 0
absence of toxin transfer, 50% of females will remate), , andj p 0.25
. Graph B shows the probability of a female remating, at them p 0.75
toxic equilibrium, over the same parameter range.
Figure 4: Graph A shows the stable level of toxin transfer at the toxic
equilibrium (solid line) and the threshold level required to initiate a
transition toward that equilibrium (dotted line), as a function of m (the
expected share of paternity gained by the last male to mate with a female),
for (implying that, in the absence of toxin transfer, 50% of femalesm p 0
will remate), , and . Graph B shows the probability of aj p 0.25 a p 3
female remating, at the toxic equilibrium, over the same parameter range.
in figure 3B, the probability of a female remating (at the
toxic equilibrium) also decreases markedly as costs become
more strongly accelerating.
Finally, we can consider the effects of m, the expected
share of paternity gained by the last male to mate with a
female. Figure 4A shows the stable (solid line) and thresh-
old (dotted line) levels of toxin transfer, as a function of
m, for , , and . The effects of thism p 0 j p 0.25 a p 3
parameter are similar to those described above for a. A
toxic equilibrium is only possible if m exceeds a threshold
level (of ∼0.48 in this case). Above this, increasing m leads
to an increase in the quantity of toxin transferred at the
toxic equilibrium, and to a rapid drop in the threshold
level required to initiate a transition away from the non-
toxic state. In other words, a strong last-male mating ad-
vantage both facilitates the initial evolution of toxicity and
favors increased levels of toxin transfer. Figure 4B reveals
that it also leads to a decrease in the probability of remating
at the toxic equilibrium.
Figure 5 gives an overview of these patterns, showing
how the equilibrium level of toxin transfer and the thresh-
old level required to trigger a transition to the toxic equi-
librium vary in relation to m (mean remating benefit) for
different values of m (last male paternity) and j (standard
deviation in remating benefit). It serves to reemphasize
that the mean benefit of remating to females is the major
determinant of equilibrium toxicity, with high benefits
leading to the transfer of larger quantities of toxin. By
contrast, last-male mating advantage and variance in re-
mating benefits have a significant influence on the stability
and accessibility of a toxic equilibrium. When last-male
mating advantage is low and/or there is much variation
in remating benefit, a stable toxic equilibrium is less prob-
able and harder to attain (and this is particularly true when
the mean remating benefit is large). Provided that a stable
toxic equilibrium exists, higher values of m and j also lead
to greater levels of toxicity, but these effects are much less
marked.
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Figure 5: The stable level of toxin transfer at the toxic equilibrium (solid
line) and the threshold level required to initiate a transition toward that
equilibrium (dotted line), as a function of m (the mean benefit that females
stand to gain from remating), for different values of m (0.5 for the first
column of graphs, 0.7 for the second, and 0.9 for the third) and j (0.125
for the first row of graphs, 0.26 for the second, and 0.375 for the third).
Discussion
These results indicate that seminal toxins can evolve as a
result of conflict between males and females over remating.
Provided that the fitness cost of the toxin increases with
the amount acquired, and does so at an accelerating rate,
a female who receives a large dose from her first mate is
less likely to benefit from remating. Under these circum-
stances, as the model shows, selection can favor males who
transfer larger quantities of the toxin because they enjoy
a reduced risk of sperm competition. Moreover, this ar-
gument applies to other damaging mating tactics as well,
not only to toxin transfer. Whenever cumulative damage
has an accelerating impact on female fitness, selection can
favor males that inflict greater harm on their mates. Sexual
conflict over remating can thus potentially explain the
evolution of morphological and behavioral traits ranging
from genital spines and barbs to sexual aggression (see
also Gowaty and Buschhaus 1998).
Toxin transfer and other harmful mating tactics should
be more common (and involve greater levels of damage)
in species with greater last-male mating advantage, since
the increased threat from sperm competition in these cases
magnifies the benefits that a male stands to gain by de-
terring remating. Even if such tactics are evolutionarily
stable, however, their initial origin may prove problematic.
When none of the other males in a population incorporate
harmful products in their semen, for instance, an indi-
vidual mutant who does so gains no advantage (since it
is only the risk of acquiring a double dose that deters
females from remating). Instead, he only suffers the cost
of a reduction in his mate’s reproductive success. The
nontoxic state, in other words, may also be evolutionarily
stable, which raises the question of how a population can
make the initial transition from a nontoxic to a toxic
equilibrium.
One possibility is that sperm competition may be re-
sponsible for the initial evolution of a certain degree of
seminal toxicity; in line with this suggestion, there is ev-
idence in Drosophila melanogaster that toxic accessory
gland products increase a male’s fertilization success, pos-
sibly by disabling or destroying the sperm of previous
mates (see Harshman and Prout 1994 and Chapman et
al. 1995). Once toxin transfer becomes established in this
way, the possibility of restraining females from remating
will start to play a role, giving rise to selection for further
increases in toxicity. Sperm competition could thus trigger
the transition from a nontoxic state to a toxic equilibrium
of the kind examined in the model. Other forms of mating
damage, too, might arise as a consequence of intrasexual
competition or other selective pressures, only subsequently
to become a means of manipulating female remating be-
havior. Aggressive forced copulation, for instance, may
evolve as a means to gain extra mating opportunities (see
Gowaty and Buschaus 1998), but such aggression could
later also be maintained or further elaborated because of
its impact on female remating.
Intriguingly, though, it may not always be necessary to
invoke an alternative explanation for the initial origin of
harmful mating tactics. Under some circumstances (e.g.,
with strong last-male mating advantage and/or strongly
accelerating costs of a toxin), this model reveals that the
threshold level of toxin transfer required to trigger a tran-
sition to the toxic evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) drops
to 0. Under these circumstances, even an arbitrarily small
perturbation of the nontoxic equilibrium is enough to
initiate evolution toward the alternative, toxic equilibrium.
This reflects the assumption that as the amount of toxin
a female acquires tends to 0, so too does the marginal cost
of increasing quantities of the harmful substance. When-
ever the marginal costs of accumulated damage tend to 0
in this way, harmful mating tactics can readily become
established in a population, because their initial origin has
negligible impact on female fitness.
The model predicts that seminal toxins and other harm-
ful mating tactics should be particularly common in pop-
ulations and/or species with higher last-male mating ad-
vantage. Unfortunately, however, one would expect
precisely the same pattern if toxicity were primarily an
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adaptation to sperm competition (from the latter per-
spective, toxins are a cause, rather than a consequence, of
strong last-male mating advantage). Empirical tests of our
hypothesis would, therefore, do better to focus on other
predictions, for instance, that seminal fluids should have
an accelerating dose-dependent effect on female fitness
(and on the likelihood of remating) or that accumulated
physical damage should impose increasing fitness costs on
females that remate. Chapman et al. (1995) have, in fact,
shown that in D. melanogaster, the death rates of females
mated to mutant males differing in the amount of main
cell fluid transferred during copulation (0%, 1%, 3%, and
100% of normal doses) increased with the quantity trans-
ferred. However, their experiments do not allow one to
determine the quantitative relationship between the
amount of seminal fluids transferred and female life span
and, thus, determine whether or not the toxin has an
accelerating impact.
Turning to the possibilities for future theoretical work,
several simplifying assumptions of the model are open to
modification. For instance, we have assumed that the costs
to males of toxin production (or of any other harmful
behavior) are negligible compared to the reduction in fe-
male reproductive success it entails. The incorporation of
a cost of production into the model would tend to lower
the equilibrium level of transfer and to raise the threshold
required to initiate a transition toward the toxic ESS. At
the same time, however, we have also assumed that the
costs that a male inflicts on his mates adversely affect his
own reproductive success, too. Costs that take the form
of a reduction in longer-term survival will have no impact
on the male’s reproductive success, though they will, nev-
ertheless, influence female remating behavior. Incorpo-
rating such long-term costs to females into the model
would thus tend to raise the equilibrium level of toxic
transfer or damage and to lower the threshold required to
initiate a transition toward the harmful ESS (i.e., to coun-
teract the effects of any cost of toxin production).
Second, we have not allowed for differential male be-
havior in relation to female mating status. The optimal
level of damage or toxicity, from a male’s point of view,
represents a trade-off between the benefits of deterring
remating (which boosts paternity) and the costs of im-
pairing female fitness (which may also reduce the male’s
reproductive success). Consequently, a male would do best
to reduce the harm inflicted on females, who have already
mated one or more times, because they are less likely to
mate again even if he imposes no such mating costs. Con-
versely, a virgin female is more likely to remate after cop-
ulating with the male in question so that he does best to
inflict greater harm. It would be interesting to incorporate
the possibility of multiple remating by females and of dif-
ferential behavior by males into the model. However, it
seems likely that early on in the evolution of damaging
mating tactics, such complex strategies on the part of males
are unlikely (particularly if female mating status is hard
to determine).
Finally, we have not considered the possibility of females
evolving resistance to damaging male tactics (Rice 1996).
The effects of this are hard to predict and would depend
on the way in which it affected the shape of the cost curve
c(t). Increased resistance might, on the one hand, force
males to increase the level of damage inflicted or to pro-
duce greater quantities of toxin in order to deter remating;
if this is costly, it could render such tactics unstable. On
the other hand, if resistance were most effective against
small quantities of damage or toxin (thus, effectively ren-
dering the cost curve more steeply accelerating), it might
actually favor the evolution of damaging mating tactics,
by reducing the deleterious effects imposed by the first
male, while leaving the cumulative damage imposed by
the second mating largely unchanged.
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